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A Principle of Intentionality
Charles K. Turner*
Retired, Brentwood, CA, USA
The mainstream theories and models of the physical sciences, including neuroscience,
are all consistent with the principle of causality. Wholly causal explanations make sense
of how things go, but are inherently value-neutral, providing no objective basis for
true beliefs being better than false beliefs, nor for it being better to intend wisely than
foolishly. Dennett (1987) makes a related point in calling the brain a syntactic (procedure-
based) engine. He says that you cannot get to a semantic (meaning-based) engine from
there. He suggests that folk psychology revolves around an intentional stance that is
independent of the causal theories of the brain, and accounts for constructs such as
meanings, agency, true belief, and wise desire. Dennett proposes that the intentional
stance is so powerful that it can be developed into a valid intentional theory. This
article expands Dennett’s model into a principle of intentionality that revolves around
the construct of objective wisdom. This principle provides a structure that can account
for all mental processes, and for the scientific understanding of objective value. It is
suggested that science can develop a far more complete worldview with a combination
of the principles of causality and intentionality than would be possible with scientific
theories that are consistent with the principle of causality alone.
Keywords: principle of intentionality, intentional relation, intention, mental processes, principle of causality
INTRODUCTION
One powerful approach to theorizing about how things go in the world is by model-building.
A model is a representation of something real, and includes hypothetical entities such as influences,
constructs, and relations. The model predicts how things will go in some aspect of reality, and
provides one explanation of it. There is not necessarily any assertion that its hypothetical entities
mirror real entities. Model-building in the area of folk psychology is discussed in Maibom (2003)
and Godfrey-Smith (2005).
Any scientific explanation of change is likely to invoke non-physical entities such as forces
and causal relations. Although they might seem manifest, they are in some sense inferred, and
thus hypothetical. In that sense, virtually all scientific explanation of change occurs in the form
of models. Prediction, too, is largely model-based, although scientific observation such as Tycho
Brahe’s records of astronomical movement allows prediction in the absence of any model.
In some scientific explanation, hypothetical entities are believed to mirror actual entities.
A particularly obvious example is that space-time is non-physical, but is taken to be an aspect
of reality. Still, there is value in the notion that even space-time is a hypothetical entity, subject
to being modified or replaced as understanding grows. Famously, Einstein transformed scientific
beliefs about space and time. And Kant suggested that space and time were simply a priori
categories of the understanding, rather than aspects of ultimate (noumenal) reality. Even when
there is substantial reason to believe that a certain hypothetical structure precisely mirrors how
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things actually are (as with the relation E = mc2), hypothetical
structures are invented models1, and the evidence that confirms
their power in prediction and explanation draws broadly from
other, often implicit hypothetical entities, such as the principle of
causality.
The science of psychology can especially benefit by treating
influences on change as mere hypothetical entities that are model-
dependent. The mind is intuitively modeled as an intentional
system, whereas the brain is modeled as a causal system. These
might both be valid models, even if intentionality is inconsistent
with the principle of causality. And allowing intentional models
to stand on their own might open the door to there being
various human sciences that revolve around models that are
inconsistent with the wholly causal models of the physical
sciences.
All mainstream scientific models seem to be causal models,
treating any consistencies in physical events as somehow
conforming to the principle of causality.2 Roughly, there is
a causal relation wherever, apart from randomness, physical
event B always immediately follows a spatially and temporally
contiguous physical event A, such that event B will not occur
if event A is blocked. The principle of causality asserts that,
apart from randomness, every physical event can be traced
to one or more causes, and thus through causal chains into
the past (quickly muddied by randomness). There is enormous
value in finding ways to model all physical change as consistent
with the principle of causality. For example, when quantum
events turned out not to follow the principle of causality,
a small adaptation of the principle solved the problem. By
treating event A as a large number of repetitions of a certain
cause, the reliable effect is a fixed statistical distribution that
can be treated as event B. Said differently, each single event
A causes a certain wave function as event B. Quantum
physics conflicts slightly with the principle of causality in
other ways. Bell’s theorem describes causal relationships that
violate the requirement of contiguity, and there are theoretical
approaches in which a quantum effect occurs slightly prior
to its cause. As with any hypothetical entity, the principle of
causality is subject to modification with new evidence of these
sorts.3
Presumably, the principle of causality, in some form, will
turn out to hold universally for physical events. This article
proposes a principle of intentionality that is inconsistent with
the principle of causality. It is expected to hold universally for
all voluntary behavior, even if all mental processes are consistent
with brain processes, and all brain processes are consistent with
the principle of causality. That is, an intentional model of the
mind and a causal model of the brain might both be valid,
1Einstein denies that even firmly established principles like E = mc2 are anything
more than theories: “Physical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and
are not, however, it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world.” The
Evolution of Physics, A. Einstein and L. Infeld, New York, Simon and Schuster,
1938.
2There are unexplained trends for which no causal explanation is offered, but
perhaps no claims that such trends are independent of complex causal explanation.
3The notion of cause is not without controversy, such as Russell (1913) and Norton
(2003).
built around hypothetical structures that are inconsistent with
each other, and might or might not mirror the structure of
reality.4
According to the hypothesis developed below, the principle of
intentionality not only guides all voluntary thought and behavior,
but is also implicated in all meaning, value, and purpose. If it
turns out to be valid, this will empower models of the mind that
might be far more powerful than any wholly causal model of
mental processes can be. Further, it might offer powerful models
of objective value and purpose, with implications in other human
sciences beyond psychology.
There is reason to doubt that causal models can adequately
account for agency or objective value. Causal models show how
things will go, but not how intentions can change the course of
physical events, nor why one direction is better than another.
They show what is true, but not how true beliefs are any more
objectively valuable than false beliefs. They seem to be What-Is
models, passively describing the universe as if it were value-
neutral. The principle of intentionality is developed below in a
manner that opens the door to value, such that one thing is
objectively better than another.
If the principle of intentionality enables powerful modeling
of both minds and value (how things matter objectively), this
might result in a Copernican revolution, in which the principle
of causality is no longer the center of the scientific universe
(in which valid scientific theories can be inconsistent with that
principle). Instead, beliefs about the world as a whole might
come to revolve around What-Matters models, in which minds
and mattering are scientifically validated, with What-Is models
as subsets that are employed to make sense of only the physical
aspects of the universe. A What-Matters model would employ
a combination of the principles of intentionality and causality,
making sense of some of the key constructs that dominate
human life, as to minds (such as consciousness, agency, beliefs,
and desires), and mattering (such as truth, good, beauty, and
purpose).
The focus of this article will be a bit more modest: an
intentional model for predicting and explaining mental processes
within the science of psychology, descriptive of minds but not
prescriptive of behavior. It will become clear how such a model
might someday lead to significant scientific investigation of
objective values, but perhaps only in the distant future. Still, it
is interesting to consider that the frontiers of rigorous scientific
understanding might extend beyond the limits of the principle of
causality, even in making sense of mental processes.
Intentionality has occupied a central place in the science of
psychology as a central concept of folk psychology rather than as
a valid scientific principle. It is invoked in how people understand
each other and themselves. Separately, there has been interest
in folk physics: how people understand the physical world.
People use implicit versions of the principles of intentionality
and causality for their integrated mental models of the world,
making them models of What-Matters. In a similar way, the
scientific intentional model outlined below is a What-Matters
4Hume (1739/1978) famously concluded that there seems to be no way to know
whether causal efficacy is real, beyond inference from experience.
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model that fully employs the principle of causality, not only
as to physical change, but as an influence on the development
of intentions, and a common distorting influence on an agent’s
baseline intentions. Neuroscience will continue to advance in
predicting human behavior by means of wholly causal (What-
Is) models. Intentional models of the mind will fully incorporate
those causal influences, both as alternative explanations of
baseline intentional influences, and as explanations of how
baseline intentions get distorted. It is reasonable to suspect
that models of the mind and models of the brain will tend
toward identical predictions of human behavior, while offering
dramatically different explanations.
THE DENNETTIAN MODEL
The general structure for intentional models is fairly familiar. It
has been stated with exceptional clarity in Dennett (1987). He
proposed it as a description of folk psychology, but suggested that
it is so powerful that it could be the basis of a scientific model of
intentionality, saying that it “seems to be a true theory, by and
large, and hence is a candidate. . . for incorporation into science”
(p. 47). This article follows and elaborates on his proposal, except
that a method is proposed for tracing temporarily irrational
behavior to identifiable causal influences.
According to Dennett, the heart of folk psychology is the
taking of an intentional stance as the primary way to predict
human behavior, as well as the behavior of various other complex
systems. This stance treats people as rational agents who choose
in conformance to their beliefs and desires. Thus, it is possible to
assess what the agent ought to do, and then infer what beliefs and
desires they must have in order to get to that rational behavior.
Beliefs, then, are invented constructs of the theorizer, rather than
actual entities.
In order to predict behavior, he says (p. 17), “you figure out
what beliefs [and desires] that agent ought to have, given its
place in the world and its purpose.” Then you figure out what
“the agent ought to do” in this situation (what the agent will
do if rational), and that is the behavior you predict. He actually
suggests a pragmatic approach to modeling desires: start with
the most basic, such as the desire to survive, eat, procreate,
find entertainment, and avoid pain, plus desiring to do other
things as the means toward those ends. He says that one must
develop “special stories” to account for an agent’s false beliefs
and detrimental desires that result in irrational behavior (p. 20).
He is referring to stable irrationality, whereas the theory below
accounts for variable rationality. Dennett calls the intentional
stance “an extraordinarily powerful tool in prediction” (p.
24) until the area to be predicted gets too fine-grained. The
Dennettian model mostly treats agents as consistent, guided
by stable beliefs and desires. The intentional model proposed
below attributes inconsistencies in an agent’s behavior to causal
influences, and suggests that it can be refined to produce accurate
predictions even at fine-grained levels.
Dennett acknowledges that it seems circular to attribute beliefs
and desires to an agent by assuming that she is acting rationally,
and yet to determine what would be rational for this agent
based on what she ought to do given her beliefs and desires. But
the “whole system of interlocking attributions. . . is saved from
vacuity by yielding independently testable predictions” (p. 50).
In much the same vein, this article suggests that the science of
psychology has implicitly employed the folk psychology model
as a starting point, and has developed methods for making and
testing such predictions.
Dennett takes pains to distinguish the brain as a “syntactic
engine” (a kind of organic computer) from the mind as a semantic
engine, operating more by meanings [and purposes] and their
complex interconnections than by automatic procedures. He
says that “individual beliefs and desires are not attributable in
isolation, independently of other belief and desire attributions”
(p. 58). It is necessary, then, to understand the whole mental
model. It is of interest how a semantic engine is realized by a
syntactic engine, but there might not be a causal relation between
the two, because “the syntax of a system doesn’t determine
its semantics” (p. 61). The implication is that brain science
investigates behavior based on syntactical structures, whereas
mind science investigates by semantic structures: meanings with
belief and desire aspects. The explanatory path for brains is in
causal chains through neural pathways and into the past, whereas
the explanatory path for minds is outward into the environment
and forward into the desired future.
Dennett denies that there is a fixed point of distinction
between being seen as a syntactic or a semantic engine (e.g.,
pp. 31–32). But at some point of complexity, the semantic
interpretation is the more powerful. In particular, if the system
(such as a person) seems to have an internal representation
(a mental model) that sufficiently fits the environment, it is
treated as an agent. His point is that science builds models
of minds by recognizing patterns that are in some sense
real, apart from causal patterns in the brain. Again, the
intentional model is built around constructs such as belief.
According to Dennett, such constructs are more real than
instrumentalist, but they might not have determinate content (pp.
39–41).
THE INTENTIONAL RELATION
Brentano (1874/1973) proposed that an intentional relation is
an aboutness relation between a meaning and whatever it is
about (whatever it points at). For the proposed scientific model,
however, the intentional relation is recast as “I intend it,” an
I-it (subject-object) relation that is mediated by the mental
meaning by which the subject points at (characterizes and values)
the object.5 In a belief, the subject implicitly asserts that this
meaning accurately represents that state of affairs, past, present,
or potential. In a perception (which is a sort of belief in this
sense), the pointing is spatial, such as the subject using her apple
meaning to identify that object. In a desire, the subject is attracted
to or repulsed by an imagined future that is characterized by
5Kriegel (2016) argues that Brentano ended up thinking of intentionality as a
property of the subject rather than the meaning, although not quite as is suggested
here.
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beliefs.6 In its belief aspect, intention is mere aboutness. In
its desire aspect, it is also an influence on overt or covert
behavior.
Desire, as used here, is any affect/feeling (such as urge, mood,
or emotion) that influences choice or value judgment. Zajonc
(1980) suggests that “the form of experience that we came to
call feeling accompanies all cognitions. . .” (p. 154), where “affect
and cognition are under the control of separate and partially
independent systems that can influence each other. . .” (p. 151).
He distinguishes approach/avoidance feelings from other sorts of
feeling like surprise and guilt (p. 152), thus seeming to distinguish
intentional affect from other sorts of affect. Biologist Freeman
(2000) says, “All actions are emotional, and at the same time
they have their reasons and explanations. This is the nature of
intentional behavior” (p. 210). Consistent with this claim, the
intentional model treats each intention as having both a belief
and a desire component.7 Beliefs model what is so and what is
likely. Desire (affect that influences choice or value judgment) is
implicated in both the direction and intensity of tendency to act.
The subject in the intentional relation is something like a
content-free, merely implied “I”, with all the content (such
as a self-concept and a means of customizing desires to each
situation) contained in the mental model. Actions are guided by
what the subject (the agent) intends to accomplish, given what
she understands of her interests, the situation, and the likely
consequences of available choices that come to mind. Thus, the
subject is in charge, but there is no apparent conflict between this
intentional model and a causal model of the brain, because both
the choice of action and the degree of motivation are modeled as
entirely reflecting the mental state by which the subject intends,
which is presumably underlain by a knowable brain state.
The intentional relation (I intend it) is independent of the
causal relation (A caused B), such that it is unlikely that the
one can be derived from the other. Whereas the causal relation
suggests a model structured around the laws of nature, the
intentional relation suggests a structure that can be characterized
as the personal perspective of a subject (agent). The perspective
implies an entire mental model that is the lens by which
the subject’s environment can be brought into focus. That is,
the subject’s mental model provides an implicit context for
all experience, and primed beliefs and desires (such as recent
perceptions) provide a somewhat less implicit model of the
environment as the immediate context. The specific intention
occurs within this context. Intentions, including perception,
are necessarily attributed to an agent using such a lens. In
order to predict and explain human thought and behavior
intentionally, the science of psychology develops a scientific
model of the agent’s mental model. Rather than treating it as
accessing fixed or definable beliefs and interests (things that
6Describing a desire in propositional language, it might be called the assertion
that such-and-such future state would be beneficial or satisfying. Such an assertion
brings rationality (and thus an objective standard) to bear on desires.
7Beliefs and desires might be treated as mere constructs, segregating an intention
artificially into contributions from cognitive (representational) and affective
(motivational) processes. The desire component of a meaning might sometimes
assign a neutral value, implicitly asserting that its object is neither attractive nor
repulsive in net.
are desirable), the mental model is more appropriately treated
as a tool for customizing beliefs and desires to the situation.
Even in a highly unfamiliar situation, this mental model tends
to make associations to meanings that might apply. Whereas
causal models of human thought make a rather sharp distinction
between the cerebral cortex as the source of beliefs and the limbic
system as the source of desires, an intentional model tends to treat
of whole meanings, their interrelations, and the broader context.8
It is noteworthy that Brentano discussed the intentional
relation in a book called Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.
According to Bartok (2005), he was especially interested in
proposing a scientific (empirical) methodology, quite apart
from the philosophy, although the empiricism he was thinking
of was phenomenological. The proposed intentional model,
in contrast to Searle (1983)9 and perhaps Brentano10, treats
all meanings as intentional (as characterizing and valuing
the intended object, even if not currently motivating action).
Meanings in a fantasy are about imaginary objects, and
one’s apple meaning during a stream of thought, even if a
scientific consideration of the class of apples, has evaluation
as one semantic dimension.11 Perhaps most or all voluntary
mental processing is intentional in this sense, supported by
involuntary processes such as memory search and predictive
coding.
WISDOM AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
INTENTIONALITY
Two centerpieces of the proposed intentional model remain to
be specified: the construct of objective wisdom and a formal
statement of the principle of intentionality.
Wisdom, as used here, is a measure of the practical
understanding and rationality of intentional beings (of believing
what you ought to believe and wanting what you ought to want,
as Dennett put it; see also Baltes and Smith, 1990). Wisdom is
an objective standard for what Dennett calls rationality. That
is, rational behavior is doing what is rational according to your
beliefs and desires, and wisdom is a measure of the adequacy
of those beliefs and desires. Roughly, intentions are wise to the
degree that they are likely to bring about desirable situations and
8The belief portion of a mental meaning, for example, might sometimes draw part
of its content from beyond the cerebral cortex. Freeman (2000), speaking of the
map-like contributions of the hippocampus says, “Intentional action cannot exist
without this learned framework, but it is a dynamic operator, not a repository of
facts or geometric forms.” (p. 217)
9Searle (1983) says, “Some, not all mental states and events have Intentionality.
Beliefs, fears, hopes and desires are Intentional; but there are forms of nervousness,
elation and undirected anxiety that are not Intentional.” (p. 1) In the proposed
intentional model, however, it is possible that such affective states are not mental
states until given meaning (where I am anxious is a belief and being anxious is
undesirable), so that it does not conflict with Searle.
10Bartok (2005) says that by the time of the 1911 appendix to his book, Brentano
had more deeply considered the ontological issues, and did not think that there
could be an intentional relation to a non-existent object (p. 22). Whether or not
Brentano was right, the proposed intentional model addresses scientific rather than
ontological intentionality.
11Osgood et al. (1957) found that evaluation such as attraction and repulsion was
the largest single dimension of most meanings.
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desirable lives, with individual differences in the wise rate by
which delayed and longer-term benefits are discounted. Wisdom
is a measure of the conformity of a subject’s beliefs to what is
so, and of her desires to what is prudentially valuable to her.
Prudential value is what that subject would desire if she were
wiser, and thus reflects what is so about what is desirable to her in
net.12 Discovering what is objectively wise is sometimes a goal of
psychology (e.g., Greene and Brown, 2009). Some psychological
research chooses situations in which the normative (objectively
wise, according to society) behavior is known, such as a correct
judgment.
Intentionality has a practical function in life just because some
intentions are objectively more adequate (wiser, more rational,
and more adaptive) than others.13 Although wisdom might be
inherently rather fuzzy, it can be made increasingly objective as
a measure, especially in controlled contexts. As Dennett points
out, intentions are inferred from what is wise, and wisdom
is inferred from what is intended, anchored by independently
testable predictions such as occur in psychological research.
Wisdom deficit of two sorts is important to an intentional model.
Ignorance is the deficit in a subject’s baseline wisdom when
compared to objective wisdom, whether that deficit is due to
lack of knowledge, a misunderstanding of actual interests, or a
defective reasoning process. Foolishness is the further deficit in
a subject’s temporarily distorted wisdom when compared to her
baseline wisdom.14
The constructs of objective wisdom, ignorance, and
foolishness suggest a framework for the prediction and
explanation of intentional behavior around the intentional
relation and the notion of mental models. The proposed
principle of intentionality might be stated as follows:
Every intentional act is guided by what is designated as wise
by the subject’s currently active mental model, whether it is
the subject’s baseline model (measured for adequacy against
objective wisdom) or a deviation therefrom (foolishness) that
is traceable to distorting influences on the subject’s beliefs and
desires.
This principle models intentional behavior around three levels
of wisdom: objective, baseline, and foolish.15 Consistent with
Dennett, the notion of objective wisdom is necessary in order
to provide an anchor point around which intentionality can
be tied to what is so. Still, to be intentional is to pursue
12Prudential value is a term that philosophers (e.g., Griffin, 1986; Taylor, 2013)
sometimes employ for something like what I am calling wisdom. It is reflected in
later regret and in patterns of learning from experience.
13The adequacy of intentions is often measured against cultural norms, the
adequacy of which must finally be measured against objective wisdom, even though
objective wisdom might vary a bit from one culture to another, just as it does from
one person to another.
14People whose baseline wisdom is worse than the norm of a culture are sometimes
called foolish. In the proposed terminology they would instead be called ignorant.
However, a subject who consistently takes action she knows to be foolish, ignoring
the likely consequences, is modeled as behaving foolishly, with her baseline wisdom
repeatedly distorted by limbic activations.
15Better-than-baseline rationality or greater-than-baseline enthusiasm might be
considered a normal (rational) response to exceptional conditions. It would only be
foolish if, according to that subject’s baseline wisdom, the effort were inappropriate
to the potential outcome.
whatever seems wise, based on the currently active mental
model. A depressed subject, for example, models the world
abnormally, and behaves intentionally (wisely) based on that
distorted (foolish) model. Equally, the beliefs and desires of an
ongoing depressed state might at some point be treated as the
new baseline.
A subject’s casual choices are sometimes inconsistent with
her baseline mental model, even in the absence of distorting
influences. It is reasonable to assume that only a tiny (and
not always very representative) slice of the subject’s baseline
model is accessed for casual choices. A subject might rely
excessively on salient and primed factors in a judgment
(see, for example, Taylor and Fiske, 1978), or fail to take
pertinent beliefs and desires into account. Intentional behavior
is conceived as wise, based on that tiny slice. Thus, some
foolishness is attributable to accidental failure to take key
considerations into account, traceable to involuntary processes
that determine which beliefs and desires get activated. The
power to predict and explain casual behavior intentionally is
dependent on modeling those processes. Further, in very fine-
grained prediction, the principle of intentionality is most effective
when operating alongside functional models of the brain. The
study of intentionality is, for now, most effective in controlled,
well-designed situations.
This intentional model is most obviously applicable to
behavior in pursuit of one’s intentions. But by hypothesis, each
meaning activated during a thought processes has belief and
desire aspects, so that it might subtly influence the direction of
thought. There are probably also involuntary cognitive processes
that have little to do with belief or desire, and yet influence
intentional behavior. For example, if an agent intends to place
a bet on the correct roulette number, processes other than
intentionality might influence what number is chosen. As another
example, well-practiced, rule-based processes such as memory
search surely interact with intentional processes in some mental
processing.
The intentional model is particularly apt for describing
those occasions in which top-down processes guide choices and
behavior. The desired future can sometimes be modeled in a
nesting of levels.16 When a domino falls, a scientific explanation
might trace it backward in space-time through a row of dominoes
to the finger that pushed the first one. Instead of continuing that
causal chain through functional processes and influential external
events, the explanation might instead continue in a nesting of
desires, where a grandmother started the domino chain reaction
to entertain her grandson, to enjoy his reaction and encourage
his liking of her, to build the bond between them, to enhance the
desirability of her life. Such nesting, although implicit and not
always conscious, is subject to empirical testing.
Notice that this principle of intentionality, when combined
with neuroscience and cognitive modeling, might someday be
adequate to predict and explain all voluntary behavior, even if
fine-grained, in ways that are consistent with ordinary notions
about mind.
16Bratman (1987) discusses this sort of nesting of intentions as pieces of larger
plans.
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THE INTENTIONAL MODEL AND
MAINSTREAM PSYCHOLOGY
Dennett suggested that the intentional stance cannot be
successful in fine-grained prediction of behavior. But a great
deal of psychological research over the past hundred years
has implicitly used something like the Dennettian model,
and has been successful in developing techniques that make
it increasingly manageable. Individual differences are almost
eliminated by modeling the intentions of the average subject.
Extraneous influences are virtually eliminated by experimenting
under controlled conditions. And researchers carefully design
situations that isolate some narrow aspect of the average subject’s
beliefs and desires, mapping the influences on behavior by
incremental changes in the independent variable. The scientific
model of the mind of the average college freshman is extended
one narrow research area at a time.
Besides exploring the rational behavior that is guided by
the subject’s baseline beliefs and desires, some psychological
research introduces variables that are designed to distort
the subject’s baseline desires (or, sometimes, baseline beliefs).
Notions like wisdom, ignorance, and foolishness are implicit
in any psychological research that compares control group
behavior both to normative behavior and to the deviant behavior
of experimental groups. Models of irrational behavior are
facilitated by the assumption that any deviation from baseline
behavior indicates a temporary distortion of the subject’s baseline
desires and/or beliefs, where that distortion is attributed to
involuntary brain processes that can often be further traced
to external influences such as the independent variable. In a
typical experiment, a control group defines baseline behavior, and
experimental groups are exposed to independent variables that
are expected to trigger something like a limbic system activation
such as a feeling of greed, anger, self-doubt, or fear. In some
research, the independent variable is expected to distort beliefs
or judgments, such as by priming a meaning that might interfere.
Baseline intentions might usually be designated as what is
normal for that subject. But ‘normal’ is a bit ambiguous. For
example, Kahneman (2011) describes System 1 and System 2
judgment processing, in which System 2 judgments are more
careful and effortful. As he notes, it is rational to do System
1 judgment processing when the stakes are low, and System
2 processing when they are sufficiently high. Either one, then,
might be treated as baseline intentions, depending on the
purposes of the research.
One of the merits of the proposed intentional model is that it
facilitates mixing causal and intentional influences in whatever
ways are convenient. Presumably, all behavior is underlain by
neural processes, so that the researcher is free to specify which
aspects of behavior are to be modeled intentionally. There
might, for example, be aspects of voluntary behavior that are
more conveniently modeled as functional brain processes for a
particular research program.
There are powerful functional descriptions of neural processes
that tend to isolate how the brain mimics intentions. Functional
models, then, might provide a valuable interface between models
of mind and brain. Dennett suggests that the intentional stance
works because “evolution has designed human beings to be
rational, to believe what they ought to believe, and to want what
they ought to want (p. 33).17 He goes on to say (p. 34) that
“a currently. . . popular explanation is that the account of how
the [intentional] strategy works and the account of how the
mechanism [the brain] works will (roughly) coincide. . . I think
some version of [this explanation] will prove correct.”
The principle of intentionality empowers the prediction and
explanation of human behavior based on beliefs and desires,
and provides the structure for a complete intentional model.
That model has practical limitations in the near-term, just
because the construct of objective wisdom needs fleshing out. The
most obvious value of the principle is in controlled situations
in which it is possible to define an operational construct of
wisdom. Beyond that, the principle of intentionality might
have immediate application in inspiring novel hypotheses for
explaining intentional behavior, and in suggesting synergies
between various existing psychological theories. It might also
have immediate application in any area in which it is useful
to make attributions to both intentional and causal influences,
such as psychophysical investigations (signal detection, context
effects, etc.) and research on extended processing, where it might
facilitate the combination of rule-based and intentional aspects.
And it has obvious application in learning and developmental
models, where the concept of objective wisdom can be valuable.
EXPLAINING INTENTIONS WITHIN
WHOLLY CAUSAL MODELS
Some models of cognitive processing, such as connectionism
(e.g., Rumelhart and McClelland, 1987) and predictive coding
(summarized in Clark, 2013) are highly successful without
addressing intentionality head-on. It seems likely that they will
continue to predict immediate interactions with the environment
in finer-grained detail than can be accomplished by any model
based on the principle of intentionality in isolation from these
functional models. But models of human cognition as internal
information processing are sometimes criticized for treating the
brain as if it were a computer processor, and in some ways a
black box. This has led to alternative, functional approaches that
extend beyond the brain to body and/or environment, typically
taking the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (1962) as a starting
point. Examples include embodied cognition (Rosch et al., 1991),
situated cognition (Clancey, 1993), enactivism (Thompson,
2007), and externalism (Clark and Chalmers, 1998). Some of
these approaches employ intentional language in describing
processes that are finally causal. Weber and Varela (2002) think
that it is a mistake to ignore the fundamentally teleological
nature of life. Portraying the viewpoint that they oppose, they
say, “In our present scientific world. . .the teleological behavior of
living beings is an illusion, an appearance hiding the underlying
17Rosenberg (1994) argues that evolution selects for function rather than structure,
biologically. From the perspective of the proposed intentional model, an assertion
like Dennett’s might mean that evolution can be seen to select for rationality more
than for neural structures. This lends support to the claim that there are objective
measures of the adequacy of intentions.
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mechanism” (p. 100). Instead, they suggest, “organisms are
subjects having purposes according to values encountered in the
making of their living” (p. 102). Di Paolo (2005), following Varela
(1991), proposes that anything is an agent that has adaptive
autopoiesis, even at the level of a single-celled organism. He
calls such an agent “a self-constructed unity that engages the
world by actively regulating its exchanges with it for adaptive
purposes that are meant to serve its continued viability” (p. 443).
Thompson (2011) proposes that “advances in biology and the
sciences of mind and brain can properly address issues about
the teleology of life and the intentionality of consciousness” (pp.
10–11). Thompson and Stapleton (2009) criticize “the traditional
functionalist conception of cognition as fundamentally distinct
from emotion” (p. 27). As they put it, “neurons do not think and
feel; people and animals do” (p. 26). But taking the influence of
affect into account does not, by itself, speak to whether enactivism
is a form of teleological functionalism. Rowlands (2009) says
that enactivism “seems to be a specific form that functionalism
might take” (p. 57). All of these approaches account for future-
directed behavior without coloring outside the lines of a wholly
causal model. They are consistent with the idea that intentional
mental processes are emergent from brain processes in ways that,
although finally causal, do not fit easily into the classic version of
causality as a unidirectional chain of causes.18
But all functional processes, even if they extend beyond
the brain and include affect, are part of what can be seen as
causal modeling, and thus as value-neutral. Nagel (1977), in
discussing biological teleology, makes a key distinction between
intentional and functional teleology. Here is how he describes
the “intentional view.” The “goal G of an action or process is
said to be some state of affairs intended by a human agent; the
intention itself is an ‘internal mental state’ which, coupled with
the internal state of ‘wanting’ G together with ‘believing’ that an
action A would contribute to the realization of G, is allegedly a
causal determinant of the ensuing action A” (p. 264, emphasis
his). Uses of intentional terms such as agent, purpose, and value
in functional teleology are what Nagel calls a ‘metaphorical
extension’ beyond the intentional view (p. 266).
On this topic, Dennett offers a telling commentary: “But
the brain. . . is just a syntactic engine. . . That’s all brains can
do. . . How could any entity. . . get the semantics of a system
from nothing but its syntax? It couldn’t.” (p. 61). He goes
on to say that the brain simply mimics semantics. For the
science of psychology, this suggests that the intentional model
of the mind is independent of the causal model of the brain.
There is considerable value in identifying processes that mimic
intentionality, but it misses the heart of what it means to be
intentional.
Consistent with what Nagel calls the intentional view, the
proposed intentional model assumes that subjects freely act in
pursuit of whatever they find desirable at the moment, given their
active beliefs and what they expect to be the effects of available
actions. Intentions have content and connection to the world
based on objective measures of their adequacy. A belief can be
compared to what is so, and a desire to what that subject would
18See, for example Cabell and Valsiner (2014).
have wanted if she had better understanding of herself, and used
better judgment processes. The more objectively adequate an
intention the more it tends to be rewarded, which is evidence of
what is objectively wise. Although Dennett and Nagel are very far
apart on the topic of consciousness, and perhaps as to the causal
efficacy of intentions, there is no apparent conflict between them
as to the nature of a scientific model of intentionality.
PUTTING THE INTENTIONAL MODEL
INTO CONTEXT
Various approaches to intentional modeling have been attacked.
For example, Carruthers (2013) denies that judgments and
decisions are guided by concrete, introspectable intentions (such
as inner speech). But he is simply insisting people infer their
own intentions in much the way they infer the intentions of
others. Elsewhere he supports intentions as being efficacious.
For example Carruthers (2008) argues that minds “are organized
into sets of perceptual systems which feed into belief-generating
and goal-generating systems, and which also inform practical
reasoning in light of the goals so generated” (p. 260). As
with the Dennettian model, this treats beliefs as constructs
inferred scientifically, rather than necessarily being determinate,
introspectively available, or even proposition-like.
Gauker (2005) asserts that philosophy has been unsuccessful
in finding any law-like formula for predicting rational intentional
behavior. “People do what they believe will satisfy their desires” is
an example of the sort of formula that he criticizes (p. 122). He
does not, however, deny that intentions are efficacious. Instead,
he is saying “that we cannot conceive of the rationality of action
as conformity to some all-purpose rule” (p. 142). The proposed
principle of intentionality is a law-like model, and should be
powerful even now in various arenas. However, the power of
this model in predicting behavior will increase only as all sorts
of blanks are filled in by empirical data and new theoretical
structures, dealing with complexities such as those described
above.
This article has suggested that behavior can be broken into two
very different models. Brain science is based on the principle of
causality, whereas mind science ought to be based primarily on
the principle of intentionality and only secondarily on causality.
The intentional model will always be at least as powerful as any
wholly causal model, because it fully incorporates causality in
whatever ways make intentional predictions most accurate.
Whereas a causal model traces behavior to external and
past influences, an intentional model traces it to interpretations
of the environment and to the imagined desirable future (as
well as to distorting causal influences on the subject’s baseline
beliefs and desires). These seem to be two different methods of
explanation, rather than competing claims. One method traces
all consistencies through the relation “A caused B,” with the other
adding “I intend it” as an alternative. There are advantages to
retaining two models, where the mind is a valid construct in one
model but not the other; where there are subjects with free will
in one model but not the other; and where it is bad to starve
to death for lack of food in one model, leaving the other model
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value-neutral. The principle of intentionality is presumably the
more appropriate approach to giving content to constructs such
as mind, meaning, belief, desire, “I”, purpose, happiness, and
value.
The principle of causality treats causes as controlling what
happens. The principle of intentionality treats intentions as
controlling what happens, not causally, but by the agent’s power
to act. The notion of free will has to do with an agent controlling
as a sort of first cause, rather than being modeled as a link in a
chain of causes.
MODELING WHAT-MATTERS
It is surely no accident that Dennett says that the science of
intentionality predicts based on what the agent ought to do.
Any wholly causal model is simply descriptive, and can only
bring value into the discussion with IF/THEN statements, such
as IF you want scientific progress, THEN it is valuable to. . .). By
contrast, any intentional model revolves around discovering and
pursuing what is desirable. It is inherently prescriptive in addition
to being descriptive, in that it prescribes behaving rationally and
pursuing wisdom, by developing truer beliefs and wiser desires:
intentions that align ever better with bringing about overall
personal good.19
There is significant scientific understanding of practical truth,
but greatly limited scientific understanding of personal good.
Thus, a scientific model of What-Matters personally (beyond
what is wise in carefully controlled situations), is currently
little more than a dream. Eventually, models of value might
gain traction, as models of mental processes become more
advanced. All of this is reminiscent of the earlier Dennett
quote about rationality, where independently testable predictions
and interlocking attributions can gradually help to produce an
internally consistent model of mattering.
The intentional model is as applicable to a community as
to individuals – to a community of minds in addition to an
individual mind. But perhaps the common good is even less
accessible to rigorous scientific investigation than is the personal
good of the average subject.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PHILOSOPHY OF
MIND
The intentional model highlights a distinction between three
kinds of knowledge. First, there is objective knowledge about
physical objects such as the brain. It is objective in two ways:
being about physical objects and being intersubjective, scientific
understanding. In addition to physical objects, it includes
objective (intersubjective) knowledge of scientific constructs such
as space-time, energy, and causality, whatever their ontological
status. Second, there is objective knowledge about people and
other physical objects that employs the intentional model. It, too,
19People are social animals, so that personal good is inseparable from the welfare
of others, but this discussion will ignore that complication.
is objective in both ways, and it adds objective (intersubjective)
knowledge of scientific constructs such as subject, mind, purpose,
value, and wisdom, whatever their ontological status. This
surely counts as objective knowledge, even though knowledge
of mental processes is currently less advanced than knowledge
of the physical. Third, there is subjective knowledge about
phenomenological experiences like pain, such that I know how
today’s pain differs from yesterday’s pain. It is subjective in that,
when I describe the difference to you, you can only infer what
I mean by assuming that we have similar phenomenological
experiences in objectively similar situations. The subject is an
objective construct of the intentional model, but the experience
of being a subject is phenomenological, something like what
it is like to be a bat (Nagel, 1974). The causal model of the
brain and the intentional model of the mind have in common
that they are objective models, with the intentional model
employing constructs missing from the causal model. These
two models serve different purposes and use different methods
of explanation, so that the intentional model might never be
adequately subsumed within a wholly causal model, even if
intentional knowledge finally adds nothing to predictive power
as to behavior.
Thus, the science of intentionality does not address
phenomenological issues such as the nature of qualia. McGinn
(1989) denies that there can be any final solution to the mind-
body problem, because you can only investigate by studying
brains or introspecting. This argument seems only to address the
causal model versus phenomenology. This article has suggested
that a different mind-body problem (leaving phenomenology
aside) is solved by recognizing that there are two valid scientific
models that serve different purposes.
Philosophers of mind such as Davidson (1970) theorize
how mental events can be causally efficacious. This article
has suggested that, within the wholly causal model, mental
events are non-existent, and thus neither causally efficacious
nor epiphenomenal, as far as science is concerned.20 Instead,
they are intentionally efficacious, personally guiding behavior.
Pain, for example, can be intentionally efficacious, apart from
the phenomenology, based on the meaning given to it, with
both perceptual and desire components. Bem (2001) promotes
explanatory pluralism in a way that seems to make room for
the proposed intentional model. He describes the psychological
level of explanation as functional but not causal, by accepting
Brentano’s notion of aboutness as a valid functional explanation
rather than a metaphysical concept (p. 789). Robinson (2010),
a philosopher trained in psychology, says, “Mental life is a life
of meanings. Physical entities are quite literally meaningless. I
take that gap to be unbridgeable” (p. 791). That seems consistent
with the principle of intentionality, regardless of the ontology of
intentionality, and quite apart from phenomenology.
Dennett’s point with the intentional stance is that it is an
invented model that works, rather than mirroring the structure
of reality. The scientific value of the proposed intentional model
is independent of the explanation for why it is so powerful. Still,
20As quoted above, Nagel (1977, p. 264) is among philosophers who treat the
intentional view as alleging that intentions are causally efficacious ontologically.
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it is striking that there might be no appropriate way to fold the
intentional model into any wholly causal model. It is possible,
then, that there are two valid models of the universe that cannot
be combined. There are at least three approaches to treating both
as valid.
The first is simply pragmatic: powerful but conflicting theories
are sometimes both treated as valid, until one is undermined or
subsumed under the other, or the two are subsumed under a
unifying theory. This is the case with the coexistence of quantum
theory and relativity theory. Both theories make powerful and
almost identical predictions of gravitational effects, but with
very different explanations. Each has ongoing value in somewhat
different arenas, but there is some expectation that the two will
eventually be rolled up into a unified theory that is superior
to either theory alone. In the same way, it might turn out that
the What-Matters model can be wholly subsumed within the
dominant scientific (causal) view of the universe, or that a new,
unifying model will arise.
A second approach is under-determination of the sort that
Quine (1975) proposes, such that two (or more) empirically
equivalent scientific models survive indefinitely, with no
scientific way to choose between them. There might always be
one model based on the principle of causality and a second
model that also includes the principle of intentionality, with
no scientific way to choose between them. Because these two
models have very different metaphysical implications, there
might be no way to resolve the disagreement between believers
and disbelievers in genuine agency. Those who deny that the
principle of intentionality mirrors anything in ultimate reality
might continue to rely on the intentional model in their everyday
lives. That is, people who reject the notion that there is agency in
ultimate reality can still warmly embrace intentionality as central,
both in their own personal lives and as a model with unlimited
value in prediction and explanation. This might be a good
representation of Dennett’s view. It is also possible that neither
the principle of causality nor the principle of intentionality
mirror anything in ultimate reality. It is possible, for example, to
adopt a Kantian view that both are merely a priori categories of
the mind.
The third approach assumes that the structure of reality is
more complex than can be represented in any wholly causal
model. Think of ultimate reality as having two interconnected
dimensions, one causal and the other intentional. The intentional
relation is real, where the intentions of an agent actually influence
physical events, and where the agent is free to change her mind.
But, by hypothesis, there might be no way to confirm this direct
influence experimentally, because the intentional and causal
dimensions are inextricably connected and fully in harmony.
Neural processes and external influences that can be traced
in causal chains into the past are integral in the formation
of intentions, such that, in principle, a wholly causal model
could powerfully predict what the agent will intend. The agent’s
intentions directly influence physical events, but there is an
epiphenomenal causal link alongside that influence, so that there
is no scientific basis for choosing between the two explanations.
It is, of course, conceivable that there will eventually be some
experimental means that we cannot yet imagine for sorting out
whether it is actually the intention that is efficacious. A two-
dimensioned universe of this sort is independent of the dualistic
claim that conscious experiences (qualia) are real but non-
physical. A dualist cites the evidence of subjective experience
to justify the reality of qualia. But a proponent of the two-
dimensioned universe might, instead, cite the utter inadequacy
of any wholly causal model for making sense of anything about
minds and mattering. And it might further be argued, consistent
with the dualist argument, that the experience of free will and
things mattering is more primitive and certain than any causal
model of the environment.
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